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Balancing Purpose, Power, and Discretion 
Between Article III Courts and the Patent 
Office 
Emily N. Weber* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The function of the United States Patent and Trademark Office 
(“USPTO”) is to promote the industrial and technological innovation of 
the nation and strengthen the economy through the preservation, 
classification, and dissemination of patent information.1  The America 
Invents Act (“AIA”) prescribed a multitude of supporting goals to best 
promote innovation, such as preserving “quality patents,”2 “timely 
consideration” of issues,3 maintaining “cost-effective” methods,4 
preventing “frivolous litigation,”5 and preventing “uncertainty.”6  The 
AIA ensures the “efficiency, objectivity, predictability, and 
transparency” of the patent system.7  Part of this act included revamping 
 
* B.S., Mechanical Engineering, University of Missouri-Columbia, 2018; J.D. 
Candidate, University of Missouri School of Law, 2022; Associate Member, 
Missouri Law Review, 2020–2021. A special thanks to Professor Dennis Crouch for 
his guidance and to the editorial staff of the Missouri Law Review for their insightful 
edits. An additional thanks to the team at Unified Patents for providing data and 
guidance. 
1 General Information Concerning Patents: Functions of the USPTO, USPTO 
(Mar. 14, 2018), https://www.uspto.gov/patents-getting-started/general-information-
concerning-patents [https://perma.cc/DCJ4-YSZM]. 
2 157 CONG. REC. S5428–29 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Coburn).    
3 Id.   
4 Audra Sawyer, Prejudicial or Probative: Determining the Admissibility of 
Decisions in Inter Partes Review Proceedings, 98 B.U. L. REV. 263, 264 (2018). 
5 157 CONG. REC. H4421 (daily ed. June 22, 2011) (statement of Rep. Smith). 
6 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW 
JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK (2008) (explaining 
that high level of uncertainty in patent law results in inefficient investment 
incentives). 
7 157 CONG. REC. S1092 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Steven J. 
Goldberg, Regulatory Law & Govt. Affairs, Vice President). 
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the adjudicatory forum located within the USPTO, the Patent Trial and 
Appeal Board (“PTAB”), a body that decides patentability questions via 
AIA trials.8  One type of is Inter Partes Review (“IPR”), a post-grant 
review proceeding.9  IPR has the potential to promote innovation and 
support the many goals of the AIA.  However, that potential is 
unrealized.  This is in part because the policies surrounding IPR are 
heavily influenced by the discretion of the acting USPTO Director (“the 
Director”).10  This discretion has allowed external factors, such as trial 
dates of district court litigation, to greatly affect the effectiveness of 
IPR.11  In the past decade, institution of IPR has been inefficient, 
subjective, unpredictable, and not transparent.  This Note explores the 
relationship between IPR and the discretion of the Director, the 
consequences of that relationship, and how that relationship is influenced 
by external factors.  
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Federal patent laws are rooted in the United States Constitution, 
which grants Congress the power to “promote the progress of science 
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the 
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.”12  The 
United States Patent & Trademark Office derives its authority from this 
provision and is responsible for granting and issuing patents.13 U.S. 
patent laws are codified in Title 35 of the United States Code, which 
governs all AIA trials in the USPTO.14  
A patent must describe an invention in “full, clear, concise, and 
exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art” to be able to 
recreate and use the invention as well.15  The patent should conclude with 
patent claims, the portion of the patent that confers patent protection.16  
The language of the claims must be “definite” to ensure that the scope of 
the claims is clear, the public is informed of the boundaries of what 
constitutes infringement of the patent, and the USPTO is provided a clear 
measure of what an applicant regards as the invention so that it can be 
 




9 Id.  
10 See e.g., 35 U.S.C. § 316(a). 
11 See infra Part III. 
12 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.   
13 35 U.S.C. § 2(a). 
14 See 35 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. 
15 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). 
16 35 U.S.C. § 112(b). 
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determined whether the claimed invention meets all the criteria for 
patentability.17  Patent quality increases when the patent accurately 
conveys the scope of the invention.18  Ensuring a patent complies with all 
relevant statutes, including § 101 eligibility, § 102 novelty, § 103 
obviousness, and § 112 specification requirements, ensures the quality of 
the patent.19  
Patent applications submitted to the USPTO are reviewed by patent 
examiners – skilled scientists and engineers who determine whether a 
patent should be granted.20  Examiners must determine if an invention is 
worthy of patent protection; that is, the invention is new, useful, and 
nonobvious.21  The USPTO employs over 8,300 patent examiners.22  In 
2019, there were 669,434 patent applications filed at the USPTO.23  
Patent examiners are allocated a pre-determined number of hours to 
review each application based on the complexity of the subject matter 
and the seniority of the examiner.24  Their pay is a pre-determined 
calculation based on these factors.25  On average, a patent examiner will 
spend nineteen hours reviewing an application, which includes reading 
 
17 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 2173 (9th ed. Rev. 10, June 
2020) (available at https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/index.html) 
[hereinafter, MPEP]. 
18 See Alan C. Marco et al., Patent Claims and Patent Scope, RSCH. POL’Y, 
Nov. 2019, at 1, 2. 
19 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102, 103, 112.  
20 Become a Patent Examiner, USPTO JOBS (Feb. 20, 2020), 
https://www.uspto.gov/jobs/become-patent-examiner [https://perma.cc/C6PR-
G6SG].   
21 See MPEP, supra note 17, § 2103 (Patent Examination Process). 
22 Promoting the Useful Art: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor 
Quality Patents: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 2 (2019) (statement of Andrew Hirshfeld, Commissioner 
for Patents, United States Patent and Trademark Office). 
23 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 – 2019, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/us_stat.htm 
[https://perma.cc/EX2R-GJP6] (last updated Apr. 2020). 
24 Michael D. Frakes & Melissa F. Wasserman, The Failed Promise of User 
Fees: Empirical Evidence from the United States Patent and Trademark Office, 11 J. 
OF EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 602, 615 (2014) (available at 
https://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=6329&context=faculty
_scholarship [https://perma.cc/R7M4-GQQQ]). For example, examining an 
application for a fishing lure is allotted 16.6 hours, while a satellite communication 
application is allotted 27.7 hours. Examination Time and the Production System, 
USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/Examination%20Time%20and%20the%20
Production%20System.pdf [https://perma.cc/F3EM-8GQQ] (last visited Nov. 15, 
2020). This allotment increases with complexity of the subject matter and decreases 
with the seniority level of the examiner. Id.   
25 Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 615. 
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the application, performing a prior art search, drafting and responding to 
office actions, and conducting an interview should the patent applicant 
request one.26  Examiners are compensated under the assumption that this 
calculation of pre-determined hours accurately reflects the time spent on 
review.27   
Two critical components of maintaining the efficiency, objectivity, 
predictability, and transparency of the patent system are to ensure “the 
timely consideration of patent applications and the issuance of quality 
patents.”28  Patent quality improves when the most relevant prior art is 
available for consideration.29  Prior art is any evidence that an invention 
was already available to the public, which precludes the availability of a 
patent.30  Patent protection is only available for ”new” inventions; if the 
invention has already been described publicly, then it is not “new.”31  
Unfortunately, due to the time constraints imposed on patent examiners, 
the most relevant prior art of an invention is not always available for 
consideration, leading to the issuance of low-quality patents.  Patents of 
low quality enable extortion of “unreasonable licensing fees from 
legitimate businesses,” sparking a “perverse form of patent litigation 
innovation.”32  Too many problematic patents “cast doubt on truly high-
quality patents.”33 
This is not a new problem and there is no simple fix.  The USPTO 
has hired more patent examiners in an effort to combat this problem.34  
However, it is almost impossible to prevent all low-quality patents from 
slipping through the cracks. What is important is what can be done after 
a low-quality patent is issued; this is where IPR shines.  
 
26 Id.    
27 Id.   
28 157 CONG. REC. S5428–29 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Coburn). 
29 Promoting the Useful Art: How Can Congress Prevent the Issuance of Poor 
Quality Patents, supra note 22. 
30 35 U.S.C. § 102. 
31 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
32 153 CONG. REC. H10275 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (letter from Safra Catz, 
CFO, Oracle Corp.) (discussing the Patent Reform Act of 2007); 157 CONG. REC. 
S949 (daily ed. Feb 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).   
33 157 CONG. REC. S949 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy).   
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A. The Development of the Post-Grant Proceeding Known as Inter 
Partes Review 
The patent process does not end after a patent has been issued. One 
may challenge a patent in civil litigation.35  In 2011, Congress noted a 
“growing sense that questionable patents [we]re too easily obtained” and 
“too difficult to challenge” through the methods available at the time.36  
To address these concerns, Congress passed the America Invents Act.37  
The AIA gave the PTAB the power to review patentability in a 
proceeding known as inter partes review.38   
Congress created IPR proceedings to provide an alternative to 
litigation over the validity of previously granted patents by 
“establish[ing] a more efficient and streamlined patent system that will 
improve patent quality and limit unnecessary and counterproductive 
litigation costs, while making sure no party’s access to court is denied.”39  
IPR allows petitioners to challenge the validity of one or more patent 
claims before the PTAB without the need for civil litigation.40  By far the 
most popular of the post-grant proceedings, IPR has become a significant 
tool for challenging patent validity.41   
B. Inter Partes Review on the Basis of Necessity 
For many alleged infringers, defending an infringement claim in 
civil litigation is out of reach financially.42  Alleged infringers, the 
defendants, often agree to settle or license the patent as the lesser of two 
evils compared to the costs of civil litigation.43  Typically in a patent 
settlement, the accused infringer will agree to pay the patent owner, 
stipulate to the patent’s validity, and promise not to challenge the patent 
in the future.44  A sweeping number of patent lawsuits settle before trial – 
roughly 90% are abandoned or settled.45 The patent cases that are most 
likely to settle involve patents that have been the subject of eight or more 
 
35 See generally 35 U.S.C. §§ 281–99. 
36 H.R. REP. NO. 112-98, pt. 1, at 39–40 (2011).    
37 New to PTAB, supra note 8. 
38 Id. 
39 157 CONG. REC. S1361 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
40 Sawyer, supra note 4, at 264. 
41 Id. 
42 Megan M. La Belle, Against Settlement of (Some) Patent Cases, 67 VAND. 
L. REV. 375, 386 (2014). 
43 Id. 
44 Id.   
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lawsuits.46  Trial courts encourage settlement through pressure by 
individual trial judges, court-ordered settlement conferences, and the pro-
settlement jurisprudence developed by the Federal Circuit.47  An 
alternative to litigation thus became necessary to prevent defendants 
from pigeon-holing themselves into settlements.48   
As evidence of this necessity, when cases involving litigation-
weathered patents are adjudicated rather than settled, the patents 
experience a higher rate of being invalidated.49  This higher rate of 
invalidation is attributable to entities referred to as “patent trolls,” who 
abuse the civil litigation process with low-quality patents.50  A patent 
troll is a person or company that attempts to enforce patent rights against 
accused infringers beyond the actual value of the patent through 
frivolous or vexatious litigation.51  Patent trolls are sometimes referred to 
as non-practicing entities (“NPE”), as they often do not manufacture 
products or provide services related to the patents at issue.52  Congress 
addressed the issue of patent trolls during arguments concerning the 
AIA.53  Congress acknowledged the existence of a “trolling situation” in 
which low-quality patents became the basis of a whole legal industry, 
creating a “huge nuisance value,” flooding the courts with unnecessary 
litigation.54  While high-quality patents are necessary for innovation, low-
quality patents damage the economy by granting protection over 
products and processes that were not inventive.55 
 
46 John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent 
Litigants, 99 GEO. L.J. 677, 689 (2011). 
47 La Belle, supra note 42, at 380. 
48 See 153 CONG. REC. E773–74 (daily ed. Apr. 18, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Berman); see also 157 CONG. REC. S936 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley). 
49 Allison et al., supra note 46, at 687. 
50 Dennis Crouch, Chief Judge Rader: Improving Patent Litigation, PATENTLY-
O (Sept. 27, 2011), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2011/09/rader-patent-litigation.html 
[https://perma.cc/4ZFF-KCDW]. 
51 Id. 
52 Jason Rantanen, Slaying the Troll: Litigation as an Effective Strategy 
Against Patent Threats, 23 SANTA CLARA COMPUT. & HIGH TECH. L.J. 159, 165 
(2006). It is important to note that not all NPEs are patent trolls, but it is a very rare 
situation for non-patent-troll NPEs to assert their patents against alleged infringers. 
Id. (“The non-patent related behavior of the patent holder plays a critical role in 
assessing whether it is a troll.”).    
53 See 153 CONG. REC. H10276–77 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Lofgren); 157 CONG. REC. S1365 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Schumer); 157 CONG. REC. H4486 (daily ed. June 23, 2011) (statement of Rep. 
Jackson Lee). 
54 153 CONG. REC. H10271 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers).  
55 157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy) 
(“Just as high-quality patents are the key to innovation, low-quality patents are a 
6
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C. Inter Partes Review in Context 
The Framers of the Constitution were aware of the dangers of 
an invalidly issued patent, fearing that such patents would not 
reward innovation but instead impede commerce.56  The Patent 
Clause of the Constitution is “both a grant of power and a 
limitation,” and Congress has a duty to enforce the balance 
between encouraging innovation and stifling competition through 
the awarding of patents that do not “promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts . . . .”57  Part of preventing stifling 
competition includes decreasing the number of “defectively 
examined and therefore erroneously granted patent[s].”58  At the 
same time, property rights and the presumption of validity on 
behalf of issued patents are at the core of a patentee’s (the 
innovator’s) interest.59  IPR contains several procedural limitations 
to enforce a balancing act on behalf of patentees and those 
questioning the validity of a patent.60  A number of these 
provisions are designed to limit the use of post-grant proceedings 
as a delaying tactic and to mitigate the negative impact these 
proceedings have on efforts to enforce a patent.61 
 
drag on the economy because the provide monopoly rents over products or processes 
that were not inventive.”). 
56 THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 315 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 
1961).   
57 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5 (1966); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8; see also 157 CONG. REC. S5374–75 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 2011) (letter from Judge 
Michael McConnell, former member of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth 
Circuit and current Director of the Constitutional Law Center at Stanford Law 
School). 
58 Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 604 (1985); cf. Oil States 
Energy Servs., LLC v. Greene’s Energy Group, LLC, 138 S. Ct. 1365, 1373 (2018) 
(“[T]he decision to grant a patent is a matter involving public rights—specifically, 
the grant of a public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that 
grant, and Congress has permissibly reserved the [US]PTO's authority to conduct 
that reconsideration.”).   
59 Robert Mazzoleni & Richard R. Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong 
Patent Protection: A Contribution to the Current Debate, RSCH. POL’Y, July 1998, at 
273, 273–84. 
60 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq. 
61 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).  
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1. Procedural Limitations of Inter Partes Review 
The interests of patent owners are protected by the procedural 
limitations of IPR.62  Congress created a higher threshold for initiating an 
IPR, in addition to procedural safeguards “to prevent a challenger from 
using the process to harass patent owners.”63   
IPR follows an oppositional model, under which the petitioner 
carries the burden of showing a claim is not patentable.64  Congress 
raised the prior threshold for initiating a claim to a new standard that 
requires “a showing of a ‘reasonable likelihood’ that a patent is 
invalid.”65  This “allow[s] the [US]PTO to avoid accepting challenges 
that were unlikely to win in any event.”66  A higher threshold was 
necessary to “weed out marginal challenges” and to preserve the 
resources of the USPTO.67  Additionally, the oppositional model allows 
for speedier adjudication of claims.68  This is due in part to the higher 
threshold forcing parties to front-load their cases, allowing these 
proceedings to be resolved quickly.69  
One of the primary efficiency gains promoted by IPR results from 
the strict timing rules the process imposes.70  After a petition is filed, the 
patent owner has three months to file a response.71  After the response is 
filed, the PTAB then has another three months to decide whether to 
institute – hear – an IPR proceeding.72  If the PTAB declines to institute a 
proceeding, then no review will occur.73  If the IPR is instituted, the 
PTAB is required by statute to issue a written decision on the matter 
within one year of institution.74  These statutorily prescribed deadlines 
 
62 See generally 35 U.S.C. 311 et seq. 
63 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
64 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).   
65 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
66 157 CONG. REC. S1326 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 2011) (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
67 157 CONG. REC. S1041 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
68 154 CONG. REC. S9987 (daily ed. Sept. 27, 2008) (statement of Sen. Kyl).   
69 157 CONG. REC. S1041 (daily ed. Mar. 1, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). To 
“front-load” is “to assign costs or benefits to the earl stage of (such as a contract, 
project, or time period.” Front-load, Merriam-Webster Dictionary (accessed Apr. 6, 
2021), https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/front-load 
[https://perma.cc/DXP5-C79S]. 
70 35 U.S.C. §§ 313, 314(b), 316(a)(11).   
71 Id. 
72 35 U.S.C. § 314(b).   
73 35 U.S.C. § 318 (a). 
74 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(11).   
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contrast the lengthy process of civil patent litigation.  Patent validity 
claims in civil courts take nearly thirty months to even get to trial.75  
Only certain matters are eligible for IPR petition.  Unlike in civil 
litigation, a petitioner in an IPR is limited to challenging a patent based 
on 35 U.S.C. § 102’s novelty requirement or on  35 U.S.C. § 103’s non-
obviousness requirement.76  The novelty requirement in § 102 prevents 
patentability if the claimed invention was already publicly available, the 
invention is not new, and the current applicants are not inventing matter 
that should be awarded exclusive patent rights.77  In other words, an 
existing disclosure anticipates the claimed invention. The obviousness 
requirement of § 103 is similar, although instead of being “identically 
disclosed” under § 102, it bars the receipt of a patent where the invention 
“as a whole” would have been considered obvious by a person having 
“ordinary skill in the art” when considering available prior art.78  Only 
patents and printed publications may be used as prior art references to 
challenge a patent in an IPR.79   
These limitations improve the efficiency of IPR.  Additionally, IPR 
includes an estoppel provision to prevent the inefficient re-litigation of 
issues already decided.80  Arguments that are “raised or reasonably could 
have been raised” by parties during an instituted IPR cannot be raised 
later in litigation.81  This estoppel provision simplifies co-pending 
litigation because it removes many obviousness and anticipation issues 
from litigation because they have already been addressed in IPR.82   
2. Cost-Saving Measures of Inter Partes Review 
Congress intended IPR to be a “faster, less costly alternative[] to 
civil litigation to challenge patents.”83  Costs to litigants have been 
reduced with IPR, which is an “in-house system” that addresses claims of 
patent infringement before a civil suit in district court becomes 
necessary.84  On a per-suit basis, civil patent litigation costs an average of 
 
75 See Chris Barry et al., 2024 Patent Litigation Study: As Case Volume Leaps, 
Damages Continue General Decline 16, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP (July 
2014). 
76 35 U.S.C. § 311(b). 
77 35 U.S.C. § 102 (“A person shall be entitled to a patent unless… the claimed 
invention was… available to the public before the effective filing date of the claimed 
invention…”). 
78 35 U.S.C. § 103. 
79 157 CONG. REC. S1375 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl 
80 35 U.S.C. § 315(e). 
81 Id.  
82 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
83 Id. (emphasis added). 
84 157 CONG. REC. S1350 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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at least $1.5 million through discovery or about $3 million in its entirety, 
while IPR costs between $200,000 to $750,000 total.85   During 
discussions of the AIA, legislators stressed the detrimental effect of 
costly dispute resolution, as it “decrease[s] innovation incentives and 
work[s] against the patent system’s goal of encouraging technological 
progress.”86    
Limitations imposed on IPR for the benefit of efficiency likewise 
decrease its cost through a substantial decrease in procedural hurdles, 
such as lengthy discovery times.87  IPR limits discovery to “the 
deposition of witnesses submitting affidavits or declarations” and “what 
is otherwise necessary in the interest of justice.”88  The strict timeline 
required for IPR similarly decreases costs.89  Inventors consider the cost 
of defending intellectual property rights when deciding whether to 
innovate.90  When that cost is high, inventors will be less likely to find 
the potential benefit of innovation to outweigh the potential costs.91  IPR 
ensures inventors have the opportunities to resolve patent disputes on the 
merits instead of being strong-armed into settlement by vexatious 
litigation.92 
3. Other Benefits and Concerns of Inter Partes Review 
Many judges are not prepared to handle patent cases.  Cases 
regarding technical issues and complex factual situations can be better 
managed when concentrated within a single decision-making body.93  
IPR provides a specialized body to review issues of patentability, 
removing the concern regarding “juries [in civil litigation, which] are 
believed to have difficulties understanding patent cases” and are 
therefore more likely to rely on “tangential factors” than juries evaluating 
 
85 See Meaghan H. Kent et al., 10 Reasons Every Defendant in Patent 
Litigation Should Consider Inter Partes Review, MONDAQ (April 26, 2014), 
http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/x/309504/Patent/10+Reasons+Every+Defenda
nt+in+Patent+Litigation+Should+Consider+Inter+Partes+Review 
[https://perma.cc/2NYN-WQBR]; see also Chris Neumeyer, Managing Costs of 
Patent Litigation (Feb. 5, 2013), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2013/02/05/managing-costs-of-patent-
litigation/id=34808/ [https://perma.cc/ST3A-WNF8]. 
86 Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267. 
87 Id. 
88 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(5).   
89 Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267. 
90 Id. 
91 Id.  
92 Id.  
93  See Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the 
Efficiency and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication; An Empirical Analysis of the Case 
for a Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 402–03 (2011).  
10
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matters that are easier to understand.94  Additionally, such a specialized 
adjudicative body aligns legal doctrine across the legal landscape – 
reducing forum shopping.95  Coordinated legal doctrine also creates 
predictable results which prevents inconsistent rulings from across the 
various circuits.96   
Before 2018, IPR and civil litigation practiced two different claim 
interpretation standards.  Previously, IPR followed the same standard 
that is currently used by examiners when reviewing patent applications, 
the “broadest reasonable interpretation” standard.97  In 2018, IPR began 
following the same standard that is used to construe claims in a civil 
action in district court, the “ordinary and customary meaning” standard.98  
This standard is narrower.99  Under this standard, patent claims are given 
“the meaning that [a] term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the 
art in question at the time of the invention.”100  However, while the 
construction standard is now the same, there remains a difference in the 
evidentiary standard between IPR and civil litigation.101  The evidentiary 
standard in IPR assigns the petitioner the burden to prove unpatentability 
by a preponderance of the evidence.102  In district courts, the accused 
infringer must prove that the patent in question is invalid by clear and 
convincing evidence.103 
4. The Challenge of Co-Pending Litigation 
When co-pending litigation poses a threat of inconsistent decisions, 
§ 315(a)(2) calls for an automatic stay of the civil action if the IPR 
petitioner filed a civil action on or after the date on which the IPR 
 
94 Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.  
95 Kesan & Ball, supra note 93, at 403–04. “Forum shopping” refers to “the 
practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a claim might 
be heard. A plaintiff might engage in forum-shopping, for example, by filing suit in 
a jurisdiction with a reputation for high jury awards or by filing several similar suits 
and keeping the one with the preferred judge.” Forum-shopping, BLACK’S LAW 
DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
96 Kesan & Ball, supra note 93, at 403–04. 
97 Id.; Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
98 Changes to the Claim Construction Standard for Interpreting Claims in Trial 
Proceedings Before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board, 83 Fed. Reg. 51340 (Oct. 11, 
2018) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 42).   
99 See, e.g., Facebook, Inc. v. Pragmatus AV, LLC, 582 F. App’x 864, 869 
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (nonprecedential) (“The broadest reasonable interpretation of a 
claim term may be the same as or broader than the construction of a term under the 
Phillips standard. But it cannot be narrower.”). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
102 35 U.S.C. § 316(e) (2012). 
103 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 598 F.3d 831, 848 (Fed. Cir. 2010).   
11
Weber: Balancing Purpose, Power, and Discretion Between Article III Cour
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository,
1030 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 86 
petition was filed.104  Otherwise, there is no automatic stay, but the patent 
litigation defendant will often file a motion to stay the co-pending 
litigation while awaiting the results of the PTAB’s decision.105  When 
discussing the AIA, legislators “expected that district judges will 
liberally grant stays of litigation once a proceeding is instituted.”106  
Since the creation of IPR, the granting of stays regarding co-pending 
litigation has been subject to much debate.107 
D. The Power Balance 
The AIA grants PTAB wide latitude in carrying out its goals.108  
Such latitude is necessary because institution of inter partes review is 
discretionary.109  The authority to institute an IPR is found in § 314(a), 
which states that the Director “may” institute an IPR if “there is a 
reasonable likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at 
least 1 of the claims challenged in the petition.”110  The Director has the 
authority to prescribe regulations which set forth “the standard for the 
showing of sufficient grounds to institute a review under section 
314(a).”111  Section 312 further enumerates the permissive nature of an 
IPR when discussing the requirements of an IPR petition, stating a 
petition “may only be considered if” certain requirements are met.112  
Even if these threshold requirements are met, there is no obligation for 
the Director to institute the petition.113  
This discretion, however, is not absolute.114  The AIA delegated the 
duty of prescribing regulations regarding the rules and procedures of the 
PTAB to the Director of the USPTO.115  In prescribing regulations for 
institution decisions, the Director shall “consider the effect of any such 
regulation on the economy, the integrity of the patent system, the 
 
104 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).   
105 See generally Douglas B. Wentzel, Stays Pending Inter Partes Review: Not 
in the Eastern District of Texas, 98 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 120 (2016). 
106 157 CONG. REC. S1379 (daily ed. Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl). 
107 Wentzel, supra note 105.  
108 See generally 35 U.S.C. § 311 et seq.  
109 See Harmonic Inc. v. Avid Tech., Inc., 815 F.3d 1356, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 
2016) (“the PTO is permitted, but never compelled, to institute an IPR proceeding”).   
110 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (emphasis added).).   
111 35 U.S.C. § 316(a)(2). 
112 35 U.S.C. § 312(a) (emphasis added). The requirements of a petition for 
inter partes review are: (1) paying a fee, (2) identifying all real parties in interest, (3) 
identifying each claim challenged, including grounds and evidence, (4) other 
information the Director requires through regulation, and (5) providing copies of the 
documents required to the patent owner. Id. 
113 Id. 
114 See 35 U.S.C. § 316(b). 
115 35 U.S.C. § 316.  
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efficient administration of the Office, and the ability of the Office to 
timely complete proceedings instituted under this chapter.”116  Proposed 
rules are to be published in the Federal Register to give interested 
persons an opportunity to participate in the rule-making process through 
submissions.117  After these submissions and other relevant matters are 
considered, the USPTO may incorporate the rules alongside a concise 
general statement of their bases and purpose.118  The PTAB can also 
make new rules through adjudication.119  This process is akin to a court 
announcing rules or standards when it decides a case.120  Sometimes, the 
PTAB hands down “precedential decisions,” which establish binding 
authority concerning major policy or procedural issues.121  Very rarely is 
a decision deemed precedential.  Only 102 written decisions have been 
deemed precedential as of the publication of this article.122  Whether or 
not a case is precedential is determined by the Precedential Opinion 
Panel.123  USPTO Director is a member of this panel, and the panel 
operates at his or her discretion.124  
III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
The discretionary authority of the PTAB has highlighted a concern 
regarding the implementation of its rules.  These concerns question 
whether or not such authority promotes the efficiency, objectivity, 
predictability, and transparency of the patent system, which are vital 
goals of the AIA in its efforts to further innovation.125   
 
116 Id. 
117 5 U.S.C. §§ 553(b), (c).   
118 5 U.S.C. § 553(c).   
119 Michael Xun Liu, Patent Policy Through Administrative Adjudication, 70 
BAYLOR L. REV. 43, 54 (2008).    
120 Id. 
121 Precedential and Informative Decisions, USPTO (Aug. 6, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/precedential-informative-decisions 
[https://perma.cc/M6Q3-4BDK]. 
122 Alphabetical Listing of Precedential Decisions, USPTO (Sept. 18, 2018), 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/decisions-and-opinions/precedential 
[https://perma.cc/4ZTG-SQVP] (last modified May 11, 2021).  The first precedential 
decision was designated in 1994. Id.  In 2020 alone, the PTAB issued 508 written 
decisions. PTAB Trial Statistics, USPTO (last visited July 18, 2021), 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup_appe
ndix.pdf [https://perma.cc/KGE7-MDYW]. 




125 157 CONG. REC. S1092 (daily ed. Mar. 2, 2011) (statement of Steven J. 
Goldberg, Regulatory Law & Govt. Affairs, Vice President). 
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A significant enlargement of the Board’s authority occurred in the 
IPR NHK Spring Co. v. Intriplex Techs., Inc.126  The Board denied a 
hearing under § 325(d) based on several non-exclusive factors which 
weighed the findings of the examiner during prosecution and the 
arguments of the petitioner.127  However, the PTAB further based its 
denial on § 314(a), interpreting the discretionary power of the statute to 
permit the Board to “consider and weigh additional factors that favor 
denying institution.”128 Here, the PTAB considered a parallel civil suit 
occurring in district court an “additional factor” for its decision not to 
institute.129  The Board stated that “the advanced state of [a parallel] 
district court proceeding” in which the petitioner had raised the same 
invalidity challenges “weighs in favor of denying the [IPR] Petition 
under § 314(a).”130  The patent owner in NHK argued it would be more 
efficient to apply the same standard of claim construction as if it were 
argued in the federal circuit, as parallel cases are inherently inefficient.131  
The Board in Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc.  expanded upon the § 314(a) 
discretionary rule promulgated in NHK.132  There, the Board cited to the 
denial of institution described in NHK under § 314(a).133  The Board 
clarified that “NHK applies to the situation where the district court has 
set a trial date to occur earlier than the Board’s deadline to issue a final 
written decision in an instituted proceeding.”134  In a case where the 
district court has set a trial date after the Board’s deadline to issue a final 
written decision in an instituted proceeding, “the Board may be less 
 
126 NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2018-00752, 
Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018). 
127 Id. at 11–12. The Board enumerated several non-exclusive factors in the 
decision to decline the IPR under § 325(d):  
(a) the similarities and material differences between the 
asserted art and the prior art involved during examination; (b) the 
cumulative nature of the asserted art and the prior art evaluated 
during the examination; (c) the extent to which the asserted art 
was evaluated during examination, including whether the prior art 
was the basis for rejection; (d) the extent of the overlap between 
the arguments made during examination and the manner in which 
Petitioner relies on the prior art or Patent Owner distinguishes the 
prior art; (e) whether Petitioner has pointed out sufficiently how 
the Examiner erred in its evaluation of the asserted prior art; and 
(f) the extent to which additional evidence and facts presented in 
the Petition warrant reconsideration of prior art or arguments. Id. 
128 Id. at 20.  
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 20.   
131 Id. at 19. 
132 Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 3 (PTAB Mar. 
20, 2020). 
133 Id. at 2. 
134 Id. at 3. 
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likely to deny institution under 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) based on district court 
trial timing depending on other factors.”135  The Board here enumerated 
six factors to balance when evaluating an argument for discretionary 
denial under NHK due to an earlier trial date:  
(1) whether the court granted a stay or evidence exists that one may 
be granted if a proceeding is instituted;  
(2) proximity of the court’s trial date to the Board’s projected 
statutory deadline for a final written decision;  
(3) investment in the parallel proceeding by the court and the parties;  
(4) overlap between issues raised in the petition and in the parallel 
proceeding;  
(5) whether the petitioner and the defendant in the parallel 
proceeding are the same party; and  
(6) Other circumstances that impact the Board’s exercise of 
discretion, including the merits.”136  
Since NHK and Fintiv, these discretionary factors have been 
repeatedly cited in written decisions as a basis on which to deny IPR.  
Between February 2019 and September 2020, the PTAB made 1,974 
institution decisions of IPR petitions.  Of these petitions, 809 were 
denied institution..137  Of those petitions which weredenied, 304 were 
denied based on procedural matters.138  Of the petitions procedurally 
denied, 194 were denied under § 314(a).139  And of the § 314(a) denials, 
at least 48 were denied on NHK/Fintiv co-pending litigation grounds.140  
Although there are only a few affected cases, those impacted are 
growing in number and denials on these grounds frustrate the pursuit of 
justice.  These types of denials based on co-pending litigation are non-
 
135 Id. 
136 Id. at 5–6. 
137 PTAB Search: Cases by Phase and Status, UNIFIED PATENTS, 
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/analytics/case-level/by-status-and-
phase?sort=-filing_date&type=IPR&up_institution_date=2019-02-01--2020-09-30 
(last visited Sept. 9, 2021); see also Board Decisions, USPTO, 
https://developer.uspto.gov/ptab-web/#/search/decisions [https://perma.cc/G5YZ-
RQL3] (last visited Sept. 9, 2021). 
138 PTAB Search, supra note 137; see also Board Decisions, supra note 137. 
139 PTAB Search, supra note 137; see also Board Decisions, supra note 137. 
140 Calculations completed by author with assistance of data provided by 
UNIFIED PATS., unifiedpatents.com [https://perma.cc/TW5H-UKHM] (last visited 
Sept. 9, 2021) (calculations on file with author); see also Board Decisions, supra 
note 137. 
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appealable, as recently confirmed by the Federal Circuit.141  Petitioners 
can request a rehearing but only within thirty days of denial.142  Such a 
frustration arose in Uniloc 2017 v.  Google LLC, where the Board denied 
Google’s petition based on co-pending litigation in the Eastern District of 
Texas.143  Google had filed a motion to transfer the district court case, 
which, if successful, would alter the trial date used to deny institution.144  
The motion was likely to be successful; just a few months prior, where 
Google filed a similar motion challenging venue in another matter, the 
Federal Circuit held that the Eastern District of Texas was not a proper 
venue for patent cases filed against them.145  Google used the likelihood 
of a new trial date as an argument to support their request for 
rehearing.146  The PTAB denied their request for rehearing, without 
addressing the probability of transfer.147  In the end, the motion to 
transfer was granted, the trial date was changed, and Google was left 
without an opportunity to try the case in IPR.148  A few months later, 
another IPR was instituted by a different party challenging the same 
patent, where all claims were determined to be unpatentable.149  For 
claims that were substantively unpatentable, is it really fair to prevent 
entities from challenging patents on the basis of procedural reasons, such 
as indefinite trial dates?  
 
141 In re Cisco Systems, Inc., 834 Fed. App’x 571, 573–74 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
Parallel denials were also issued in Google LLC v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, No. 20-2040 
(Fed. Cir. 2020) (order denying writ of mandamus) and Apple Inc. v. Maxell, Ltd., 
No. 20-2132 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (order denying writ of mandamus). See also Dennis 
Crouch, Federal Circuit: No Appeal of IPR Institution Denial, Even If Denied for 
Extra-Statutory Reasons, PATENTLY-O (Nov. 2, 2020), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/11/federal-institution-statutory.html 
[https://perma.cc/XY45-RKXD]. A decision to institute or deny institution of an IPR 
on the basis of the one-year time bar is non-appealable under Thryv v. Click-to-Call 
Technologies. Thryv v. Click-to-Call Technologies, 140 S.Ct. 1367, 1375 (holding 
that an institution decision under § 314(a) is non-appealable on the basis of the § 
315(b) time-bar).   
142 37 C.F.R. § 42.71(d)(2).   
143 No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 8 at 2 (PTAB May 12, 2020) (decision denying 
institution of inter partes review); see generally Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 
2:18-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2020). 
144 Motion to Transfer Venue, Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, 2:18-cv-
00502 (E.D. Tex. July 1, 2020), ECF No. 55. 
145 See In re Google, 949, F.3d 1338, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2020). 
146 Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 9 at 11 
(PTAB Apr. 27, 2020) (Petitioner’s request for rehearing). 
147 Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google LLC, No. IPR2020-00115, Paper 10 at 8 
(PTAB May 12, 2020) (decision denying petitioner’s request for rehearing). 
148 Order Granting Motion to Transfer Venue, Uniloc 2017 LLC v. Google 
LLC, 2:18-cv-00502 (E.D. Tex. June 19, 2020), ECF No. 277.   
149 Vudu, Inc. et al. v. Uniloc 2017 LLC, No. IPR2020-00677, Paper 10 
(PTAB Jan. 19, 2021).  
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IV. DISCUSSION 
Roughly eight million patents have issued since 1963.150  The harsh 
reality of the U.S.  patent system is that many of these were later found 
invalid and never should have been granted.151  This reality will 
assuredly continue to apply to patents that have yet to issue.  Examiners 
are overworked, have little time allotted for patent examination, and are 
underpaid.152  These conditions allow invalid patents to slip through the 
cracks.  Invalid patents hinder “the progress of science and useful arts” 
as outlined in the Constitution.153  Post-grant proceedings are useful tools 
to protect American interests from invalid patents.154  However, what is 
considered an “American interest” to protect is subject to 
interpretation.155    
The AIA implemented IPR to “establish a more efficient and 
streamlined patent system” with the goals of “improv[ing] patent quality 
and limit[ing] unnecessary and counterproductive litigation costs.”156  
Managing both patent quality and cost were significant goals of the 
bill.157  However, in many recent PTAB decisions, the Board, under its 
IPR discretion in § 314(a), justified its decisions not to institute on the 
basis of speed, citing conflicts created by the potential of co-pending 
litigation.158  Congressed drafted the AIA explicitly with the idea of co-
pending litigation in mind, as evidenced by § 315, which discusses the 
relationship of an IPR filing to other proceedings or actions.159  The 
Board in NHK even noted that “an objective of the AIA… [is] to provide 
 
150 U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 – 2019, supra note 23. 
151 For example, 111 patents in 2020 were determined to contain no patentable 
claims after being challenged in IPR. PTAB Trial Statistics: FY20 End of Year 
Outcome Roundup, USPTO, 
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ptab_aia_fy2020_roundup.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/WG2X-C9PT] (last visited July 26, 2021). 
152 According to a 2007 survey of patent examiners by the Government 
Accountability Office, 70 percent of patent examiners over the prior year worked 
unpaid overtime to meet their production goals, some more than 30 extra hours in a 
2-week period. Frakes & Wasserman, supra note 24, at 666. 
153 U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 8. 
154 United States Patent and Trademark Office, Post Grant Review, 
https://www.uspto.gov/patents/ptab/trials/post-grant-review [https://perma.cc/7GSZ-
YJC3]. 
155 Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank C. Cross, Stability, Predictability and the 
Rule of Law: Stare Decis as Reciprocity Norm. 
156 157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
157 Id. 
158 See e.g., Google LLC v. Personalized Media Communications, LLC, No. 
IPR2020-00722, Paper 22 (PTAB Aug. 31, 2020). 
159 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (“During the pendency of an inter partes review, if 
another proceeding or matter involving the patent is before the Office…”). 
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an effective and efficient alternative to district court litigation.”160  
Nonetheless, the statute grants the Director the authority to determine the 
manner in which such co-pending litigation is addressed.161  Recently, 
the percentage of procedural denials has almost doubled from 2016 
(5.5%) to 2019 (12.7%).162  A significant portion of that rise is due to the 
Board exercising its discretion under 35 U.S.C.  § 314(a).163  The written 
decisions denying institution on grounds of co-pending litigation 
acknowledge the malleability of trial dates; many of the decisions noted 
that the trial dates used to deny institution were uncertain.164  The 
decisions also noted concerns with trial dates due to the uncertainties 
created by the COVID-19 pandemic, yet still denied on § 314(a) co-
pending litigation grounds.165  The quick rise in § 314(a) denials, in 
combination with the malleability of the trial dates of co-pending 
litigation upon which many of these IPR denials are based erodes the 
predictability of IPR.166   
A. External Components: The Influence of District Court Litigation 
The influences of external components are best illustrated by 
comparing the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas.  The Eastern and 
 
160 NHK Spring Co. v. Intri-Plex Technologies, Inc., No. IPR2018-00752, 
Paper 8 at 20 (PTAB Sept. 12, 2018) (citing General Plastic Industrial Co. v. Canon 
Kabushiki Kaisha, No. IPR2016-01357, Paper 19 (PTAB Sept. 6, 2017)). 
161 35 U.S.C. § 315(d) (“[T]he Director may determine the manner in which the 
inter partes review or other proceeding or matter may proceed, including providing 
for stay, transfer, consolidation, or termination of any such matter or proceeding.”). 
162 2019 PTAB Annual Report, UNIFIED PATENTS, 
https://portal.unifiedpatents.com/ptab/annual-report?year=2019 
[ttps://perma.cc/56A8-T7H8] (last visited July 14, 2021). 
163 Id. 
164 Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 7 (PTAB 
May 5, 2020) (“There is some uncertainty as to whether trial will actually occur on 
[the date stated].”); Ethicon, Inc. v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. of Tex. System, IPR2019-
00406, Paper 27 at 10 (PTAB June 10, 2020) (where the Board had received notice 
that the trial date had been suspended, but expected trial to occur within a year, “in 
all likelihood.”).    
165 Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 8 (PTAB 
May 5, 2020) (“[T]here is uncertainty about what effect the coronavirus disease 
2019 (‘COVID-19’) pandemic will have with respect to the trial date.”); Google 
LLC v. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC, IPR2020-00722, Paper 22 at 7 (PTAB 
Aug. 31, 2020) (“[W]e decline to speculate whether that date will change due to 
COVID-19 disruptions.”). 
166 See Intel Corp. v. CSLI Technology, IPR2020-00106, Paper 17 at 8 (PTAB 
May 5, 2020); Google LLC v. Personalized Media Commc’ns, LLC, IPR2020-
00722, Paper 22 at 7 (PTAB Aug. 31, 2020). 
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Western Districts of Texas have become hotbeds for patent litigation.167  
The Western District of Texas is a choice venue, as the ability to achieve 
expedited trial deadlines that are useful to patentees seeking to avoid 
PTAB review is a feature recently exploited by such patent owners.168  
The Western District allows plaintiffs to select Waco when filing their 
complaints, assuring that a particular judge (Judge Albright) will be the 
one to hear their cases.169  Because of this, forum shopping in the patent 
field has boomed, and in just a few years the Waco division has become 
the number-one patent litigation venue in the United States.170  The Waco 
Division of the Western District of Texas received only twenty-eight 
patent cases in 2018, the year Judge Albright took the bench.171  In 2020, 
only two years later, it received 813 patent cases, or almost 22% of the 
patent cases filed nationwide.172   
In both the Eastern and Western Districts, cases are rarely 
transferred out-of-district.173  Additionally, these districts 
disproportionately deny stays awaiting institution of IPR.174  As of 
August 31, 2015, the grant rate for stays pending IPR in the Eastern 
District of Texas was only 15.6%, 4.65 times less than the nationwide 
average of 72.5%.175  More than 96% of patent infringement suits in the 
 
167 Paul R. Gugliuzza & J. Jonas Anderson, How the West Became the East: 
The Patent Litigation Explosion in the Western District of Texas, PATENTLY-O 
(Sept. 15, 2020), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosion-
district.html [https://perma.cc/7GCX-HDYD]. 
168 Jason Rantanen, How the West Became the East: The Patent Litigation 
Explosion in the Western District of Texas, PATENTLY-O (Sept.  15, 2020), 
https://patentlyo.com/patent/2020/09/litigation-explosion-district.html 
[https://perma.cc/YCG7-PKPK].   
169 Amended Order Assigning the Business of the Court, W.D.  Tex.  (Dec.  4, 
2019), https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/wp-
content/uploads/Standing%20Orders/District/Amended%20Order%20Assigning%20
Business%20of%20the%20Court%20120419.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZU7K-9X38].  
There are only two judges in Waco, Texas for the Western District, Judge Alan 
Albright in addition to a magistrate judge.  Judges’ Directories and Biographies: 
Waco, U.S.  DIST.  COURT W.  DIST.  TEX., https://www.txwd.uscourts.gov/judges-
information/judges-directory-biographies/ [https://perma.cc/9NH9-56K4] (last 
visited Nov.  3, 2020).   
170 David G. Henry, Western District of Texas Gets an Upgrade: A Look at the 
New Waco Courtroom, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 20, 2021), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2021/01/20/western-district-texas-gets-upgrade-look-
new-waco-courtroom/id=129125/ [https://perma.cc/6XSK-26YB]. 
171  Rantanen, supra note 168. 
172 2020 Patent Dispute Report: Year in Review, UNIFIED PATS. (Jan. 1, 2021), 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020-patent-dispute-report-year-in-review 
[https://perma.cc/9XPZ-K8SH]. 
173 Rantanen, supra note 168. 
174 Wentzel, supra note 105, at 137. 
175 Id. 
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Eastern District are brought by NPEs.176  This trend shows no indication 
of slowing.177  Between September 16, 2012 and August 31, 2015, 66.7% 
of patent infringement cases were filed by NPEs, and 30.0% were filed 
by NPEs in the Eastern District.178  In the first eight months of 2015, 
68.0% of patent infringement suits were filed by NPEs, and 44.7% were 
filed by NPEs in the Eastern District.179  Even though the use of IPRs is 
increasing, the number of successful motions to stay district court 
litigation pending the outcome of IPRs is now decreasing despite initially 
being quite favorable.180  These two districts have curated their patent 
dockets and have drastically altered the patent system in the span of only 
a few years.181  
While the number of petitions denied on NHK grounds represents a 
small fraction of overall IPR denials, this low quantity should not prevent 
investigation of the validity of the patent at issue for the interests of 
justice.182  Additionally, this trend is rising.183  Taking a look at the 
corresponding district court trials of the forty-eight § 314(a) denials 
decided between February 2019 and September 2020,  those 48 denials 
corresponded to twenty copending district court trials.184  Only one of the 
trial dates used in the related institution decisions was accurate.185 Five of 
the IPRs corresponded to district court trial dates that were less than 
fifteen days delayed from the trial date used to deny institution.186  
Nineteen of those IPRs correspond to trials that occurred long after the 
expected trial date listed in the institution denial.187  However, what is 
most concerning is the fact that sixteen of these IPRs correspond to six 
 
176 Id. at 120–21. 
177 Id. 
178 See id. at 123. Douglas B. Wentzel collected this data by searching the RPX 
Patent Litigation Database and Docket Navigator for all patent infringement suits 




182 See supra notes 143–49. 
183 Robert Colletti et al., The Recent Rise of Discretionary Denials at the 
Patent Trial and Appeal Board, JDSUPRA.COM (Nov. 19, 2020), 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/the-recent-rise-of-discretionary-97285/ 
[https://perma.cc/9MBK-TRHH] (“In 2016, the Board denied just 5 petitions…in 
2017, that number increased to 15; by 2018, it was 45; in 2019, it was 75, and by the 
end of 2020, the number of §314(a) denials will likely exceed 150.”). See also PTAB 
Procedural Denials and the Rise of § 314, UNIFIEDPATENTS.COM (May 13, 2020), 
https://www.unifiedpatents.com/insights/2020/5/13/ptab-procedural-denial-and-the-
rise-of-314 [https://perma.cc/3YV4-UV46]. 
184 See supra note 140. 
185 Id. (calculations on file with author). 
186 Id. (calculations on file with author). 
187 Id. (calculations on file with author) 
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district court trials that have yet to be heard.188 In fact, the case that 
serves as the namesake of this rule  ̧Fintiv, is expected to be heard seven 
months after the original trial date used to deny institution of IPR; if the 
trial is not delayed, Judge Albright will finally hear the case just around 
the time of this article’s publishing.189  
 
188 Id. (calculations on file with author). 
189 Amended Order Resetting Jury Trial for 10/4/2021, Fintiv, Inc. v. Apple, 
Inc., 1:19-cv-01238 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 10, 2021), ECF No. 217. 
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Figure 1. Illustrative Comparison of the Copending District Court 
Cases from the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas Following 
Institution Denial of IPR (Where IPR Institution was Decided Between 
February 2018 and September 2020)190 
 
 
190 See supra note 140.  After identifying the IPRs where institution was denied 
due to copending litigation, the expected trial dates used in institution denial were 
compiled and then compared to current district court trial status (last checked Sept. 
9, 2021). 
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Judge Rodney Gilstrap of the Eastern District of Texas presides 
over a large portion of the trials that are heard relatively on time; on the 
other hand, Judge Alan Albright of the Western District presides over a 
portion of cases where the trial date used to deny institution under NHK 
has shifted significantly or has not even been decided yet.191  This is 
expected to increase, largely attributable to his advertising of the 
Western District as a patentee-friendly forum.192    
The issue of co-pending litigation is not the only concern with these 
two districts; it adds another layer to the fact that these two districts 
rarely transfer cases and are disproportionately against granting stays 
awaiting IPR.193  In essence, the Eastern and Western Districts of Texas 
operate on a completely different spectrum from the rest of the country.  
That is not to say that the Eastern and Western Districts act similarly.  
While the Eastern District has at least some sense of predictability, as it 
maintains trial dates, the Western District has no such tendencies.  This 
vastly disparate operation highlights the issues of the discretionary 
balancing game.  This style of case management is arguably efficient, as 
co-pending litigation can impart conflicting rulings but can also leave 
objectivity, predictability, and transparency unaddressed.  This erosion 
undermines the proceeding as a useful tool to verify patent validity.  
Such admittedly unpredictable trial dates should not be used as a basis to 
deny IPR institution, especially in venues that have a history of 
unpredictability.  A predictable patent system ensures that patent drafters 
and readers alike are able to properly interpret the scope of a patent.  A 
decline in the predictability of the system opens the door for 
manipulation.   
B. Internal Components: The Discretionary Authority of Institution 
Decisions 
The predictability and transparency of the adjudication process is 
undermined when the Board has largely unchecked rulemaking power.194  
High use of precedential decisions concerning major policy or procedural 
issues injects uncertainty into the patent system.195  Uncertainty works 
against the patent system’s goal of encouraging technological progress 
by making innovation more costly, which in turn can decrease innovation 
incentives.196  The Board has used precedential decisions to promulgate 
 
191 See supra note 140. 
192 Rantanen, supra note 168 (exhibiting that the unchecked rulemaking power 
of the board is an issue of NHK/Fintiv). 
193 Rantanen, supra note 168; Wentzel, supra note 105, at 137. 
194 See also PTAB Procedural Denials and the Rise of § 314, supra note 183. 
195 Id. 
196 Sawyer, supra note 4, at 267.  
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rules at a significantly higher rate in recent years (See Fig. 2).197  
Designation of PTAB decisions as precedential reached an all-time high 
in 2019 at seventeen decisions, more than four times the amount of any 
previous year.198  This recent uptick in precedential decisions leads one 
to question whether the PTAB is increasing the predictability and 
transparency of the system or if it is injecting uncertainty.  
 
Figure 2.  Precedential Decisions Over Time.199 
 
The Board is ostensibly acting within its statutory authority.  
However, the discretion promulgated by the Board departs from the 
intent of the legislature.200  The discretion of decision making provided in 
§ 314(a) combined with the flexibility of the regulations provided by the 
current Director in § 316 cultivates the Director’s position as one of 
significant influence and control.201  The  President appoints the Director 
of the USPTO with the advice and consent of the Senate.202  This makes 
the position inherently partisan.  Patent rights are a highly contentious 
subset of property rights.203  Allowing such partisanship does not provide 
objectivity and predictability when this position is subject to change 
 
197 See infra Figure 2. 
198 Id. 
199 Graph created from data found in Alphabetical Listing of Precedential 
Decisions, supra note 122. 
200 157 CONG. REC. S951 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. Hatch). 
201 35 U.S.C. § 314(a); 35 U.S.C. § 316. 
202 35 U.S.C. § 3(1).   
203 Richard A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics 
Approach, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 57, 59, 72–73 (2005). 
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every presidential election.  Political figures should not “inject 
uncertainty into the patent system which will take years of litigation to 
sort out and that creates unknown ramifications for American 
innovation.”204  When the discretionary authority provided to the 
Director has significant and immediate effect, the Director has the 




204 S. REP. NO. 110-259, at 75 (2008) (minority views by Sens. Coburn, 
Specter, Grassley, Kyl, and Brownback). 
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C. The Underlying Issue 
The discretionary authority of federal judges combined with the 
discretionary authority of the USPTO Director creates a double-layered 
opportunity for discretionary decision-making.205  However, this 
treatment of IPR is not unsupported by the legislation; IPR was meant to 
be an “alternative” to civil patent litigation, not a substitute.206  The 
authority granted to the Director when prescribing rules governing IPR is 
purposefully broad.207  Arguably, the Board has not stepped outside of 
the bounds of this authority.208  Similarly, a federal judge’s discretion is 
purposefully broad.209  When setting trial dates, a judge must issue a 
scheduling order “as soon as practicable… unless the judge finds good 
cause for delay.”210  Such “good cause” is subject to the interpretations of 
the judge.211  However, an issue arises when the discretionary actions of 
a regulatory agency provide the opportunity for a single district court 
judge to substantially affect the entire patent system.212  This overlap in 
discretionary authority provides an opportunity to push patent policy in 
ways not contemplated by each entity, the PTAB and federal district 
courts, when viewed individually.  
District judges that pushed the limits of their discretion in 
conjunction with the near-unchallenged authority of the PTAB’s 
institution decisions – while technically within prescribed statutory 
authority – opens the door for abuse.213  Of all the discretionary factors 
promulgated by NHK/Fintiv, it is surprising that the history of the judge, 
notably their predictability in retaining the trial dates as originally set, is 
not considered.214  These discretionary rules counteract the desire of 
 
205 See 35 U.S.C. § 2; In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d at 1336. 
206 157 CONG. REC. S952 (daily ed. Feb. 28, 2011) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley). 
207 See 35 U.S.C. § 314(a). 
208 It is important to note a current case in the Northern District of California 
regarding the NHK/Fintiv discretionary authority and notice-and-comment 
rulemaking in Apple Inc., v. Iancu, arguing that such rulemaking authority conflicts 
with the Administrative Procedure Act. Apple Inc., v. Iancu, No. 5:20-cv-6128, 2021 
WL 411157, at 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 5, 2021). Additionally, a case questioning the 
constitutionality of the appointment of PTAB judges was granted certiorari, after the 
Federal Circuit ruled in 2019 that the current statutory scheme for appointing 
administrative patent judges to the PTAB violated the Appointments Clause of the 
U.S. Constitution. Arthrex, Inc. v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., 141 S. Ct. 551 (2020). 
209 In re Apple Inc., 979 F.3d at 1337–38. 
210 Fed. R. Civ. P. 16(a)(2). 
211 Id. 
212 Gugliuzza & Anderson, supra note 167. 
213 Gugliuzza & Anderson, supra note 167. 
214 Apple, Inc. v. Fintiv, Inc., No. IPR2020-00019, Paper 11 at 5–6 (PTAB 
Mar. 20, 2020). 
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legislators to “mak[e] sure no party’s access to court is denied” when 
such rules are used to effectively bar access to IPR.215  This discretionary 
NHK/Fintiv trial date rule encourages patent owners to file a civil suit in 
a district court where they will assuredly receive a trial date that would 
overlap with the PTAB’s written decisions, thus triggering the PTAB’s 
discretionary rule and ultimately leading to denial of institution.  Such 
actions effectively bar use of IPR.   
V. CONCLUSION 
The PTAB is still a relatively new adjudicatory board in the patent 
review process.216  IPR is a useful process by which alleged infringers 
can defend their business and prevent forced settlements from patent 
trolls.217  There are arguments that IPR is an avenue that allows easy and 
repeated attacks on patent owners, but the threshold requirements for IPR 
and limitations regarding novelty and obviousness make that a non-issue 
for truly valid patents.218  IPR is limited to considerations of novelty and 
obviousness, has a statutory deadline, and provides an alternative to 
defendants who feel strong-armed into settlement.219  However, the 
PTAB is testing the waters with its implementation of discretionary 
reasoning, that is arguably out of line with the intentions of the AIA.220  
The PTAB’s discretionary reasoning is overbroad and underinclusive at 
the same time, as justifications for decisions become easy to defend 
using the six factors of § 314(a), yet these justifications ignore the 
history of the trial judge, which undermines the predictability of the 
system.221  The availability of IPR as an alternative to civil litigation has 
the potential to improve patent quality and decrease litigation costs.  But 
the regulations governing the proceeding depend upon the ideology of 
the USPTO Director, which is a politically partisan position.222  It is 
undeniable that such authority promulgated to the Director provides an 
opening for partisan desires to dominate, especially when combined with 
the discretionary authority of federal district judges.  Subjecting a large 
portion of the PTAB’s power to the changing ideologies of the Directors 
decreases the efficiency, objectivity, predictability, and transparency of 
the patent system.  This level of authority should be questioned; 
 
215 157 CONG. REC. S1349 (daily ed. March 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
216 See supra note 207. 
217 See Landu, supra note 206. 
218 See 35 U.S.C. § 311(b); Malone, supra note 106. 
219 See supra Part II–C. 
220 See Colletti et al., supra note 183. 
221 See supra Part IV. 
222 35 U.S.C. § 3(1). 
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significantly, the trial-setting accuracy of district court judges should not 
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